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One of the intriguing stories of the last four centuries’ history has been that of the 
settlers who arrived from Europe, but mainly England, and established colonies 
in North America, which they called the New World. Already on arrival, they 
brought with them the idea of being God’s chosen people based upon the Biblical 
Jews, therefore, they saw themselves as an exceptional community. With time this 
thought only strengthened and when the thirteen colonies successfully fought for 
their independence from Great Britain, the American nation took this idea as a 
building block in its own historical destiny. "e next more than two centuries 
brought success upon success, so the citizens of the United States found a national 
credo, a mystical but enforcing intellectual force that can be hardly understood on 
a rational basis and which is even today is shared by a large majority of Americans. 
In the past four decades the historical literature has delved into the roots and 
meaning of this phenomenon. 
"e rich literature on American exceptionalism has recently produced another 
volume. Hilde Restad examines the phenomenon in American foreign policy, and 
this fact makes it somewhat di#erent from other books dealing with the same topic.1 
Restad posits that there are three pillars of American exceptionalism: di#erence 
from Europe, the unique role in history, and the exemption from the laws of 
history. Her thesis is the following: American exceptionalism is not only a useful 
tool in describing American identity, but one of the most important forces behind 
a “unilateral internationalist foreign policy,” that has been constant throughout the 
history of the United States. (3) "erefore, the author wishes to show that America as 
a country, from the very beginning, has always tried to get ahead in the international 
arena by playing according to its own set of rules and interests—whether trade, 
economic, political, or military steps were concerned. Restad wants to prove that 
the long-standing picture is false that the U.S. foreign policy—partly on account 
of the two di#erent interpretations of American exceptionalism, namely example 
1 Hilde Restad is Associate Professor of International Studies at Bjorknes University College in Oslo, 
Norway. Her doctoral thesis was on American exceptionalism as an identity and its e#ect on historic 
U.S. foreign policy traditions. She frequently comments on American politics in the Norwegian media.
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and intervention—has been cyclical in the sense that once it showed isolationist 
motives, while other times internationalist intentions came out on top. She feels 
that not only do these ideas give way to oversimpli$cation, but they also produce 
an insoluble tension on further examination, therefore, they are not useful for 
relevant analysis. "ereby Restad questions the classical point of view concerning 
the traditional description of the history of American foreign policy. "e most acute 
questions that she assails are the following: are there indeed two strains inherent in 
American exceptionalism (example and intervention), or is there only one side to 
this notion? Is American foreign policy cyclical and periodical, or is it constantly 
wedded to the basic interests stemming from the American exceptionalist thesis? 
And, based upon the $rst two questions, did the twentieth century really bring a 
new characteristic to U.S. foreign policy, or did it already during in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century show the signs of “unilateralist internationalism?” "ese 
are intriguing questions to historians and political theorists alike, and the quest for 
the answers makes the book an important reading.
Restad gives a detailed argument why, in her analysis, there are no two di#erent 
interpretations of American exceptionalism, thereby she $nds fault with a large 
segment of the popular and widespread literature that states that there are the 
exemplary vein and the missionary vein. According to this, in the $rst period of 
American history the $rst dominated, while from the Spanish-American War 
the latter has been decisive in American foreign policy. She does not deny the 
possibility of the dichotomy of the exceptionalist view, but she argues that when 
it comes to U.S. foreign policy, all along the desire to reform the world has been 
the constant force. She highlights three elements in American exceptionalism: 
religious, secular, and political aspects. "ese three fundamentals give the basis for 
American identity: the American is an exceptional nation. "is notion is re%ected 
in the history of the U.S. foreign policy. 
"e third chapter gives a thorough analysis of the traditional understanding 
of U.S. foreign policy and the errors therein, and Restad contrasts these with 
her own interpretation. "e traditional school’s major hypothesis is, which lately 
has undergone some correction, that the United States for a long time after its 
birth conducted an isolationist foreign policy, which only changed around 
the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the country entered the 
international arena for good. Restad $nds fault with this explanation and argues 
that the United States has always practiced an active foreign policy, which she calls 
“unilateral internationalism,” which is, and that is the really important feature of 
her thesis, strongly connected to the idea of American exceptionalism. As is well 
known, the isolationist-neutralist paradigm is derived from Washington’s Farewell 
Address, Je#erson’s First Inaugural, and the Monroe Doctrine. As Restad points 
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out, it is valid only from a great power point of view. "e United States at this 
stage did not have the military potential to compete with the traditional European 
powers, and the physical distance also would have made any such undertaking 
impossible. However, if one looks at trade, the story is very di#erent. In this realm 
the United States has been very active from day one. "e United States wanted 
to become a trading power $rst, and only then did it think of expansion—a very 
understandable logic on America’s part. "e expansion on the North American 
continent should not be viewed as domestic policy, because the continental 
territory quadrupled after the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783. Accordingly, what 
George Washington expressed was much more in line with realizing the country’s 
interests rather than isolation from the world. As Restad puts it, “what we can take 
away from the Farewell Address, rather than isolationism, is unilateralism.” (71) 
"is line of thinking was further strengthened by Je#erson, who during the War 
of Independence was talking about an “Empire of Liberty,” a concept that in his 
presidential years became “Empire for Liberty.” And the famed Monroe doctrine 
of 1823 also wished to safeguard free room for Americans for maneuvering in 
Latin America. "at is why Restad claims that by 1824 “the American empire 
was already in existence.” (76) In this reading the Spanish-American War in 1898 
did not represent a break in an otherwise continuous foreign policy practice, it 
only highlighted further expansion. For this reason, the isolationist interpretation 
for nineteenth-century American foreign policy, which is still holding a strong 
position, is, in Restad’s view, “wholly incorrect.” (82)
"e fourth chapter is the longest part of the book, which deals with the position 
and behavior of the United States in the international arena after World War I 
and World War II, respectively. Restad introduces the major components of both 
the realist and neorealist interpretations, and she criticizes them as well for lack of 
certain aspects from their conclusions. And this missing piece is the cornerstone of 
the historical constant national identity: American exceptionalism. Without this, 
argues the author, American foreign policy cannot be soundly analyzed, and if one 
does not take this into account one will arrive at false conclusions, especially what 
regards the twentieth century. "e basic nature of American foreign policy did not 
change in the interwar years: all throughout it aimed at securing American interests 
to the maximum possible extent. "e di#erence between 1919 and 1945 was that 
after World War II the American leadership was able to put American interest in 
a multilateral-looking world, and that is exactly the reason why it created such a 
world order.
Arguably the next two chapters are the most interesting part of the book, at 
least these provide the case studies to prove Restad’s point above. She wishes to 
demonstrate with the two World Wars and their outcomes concerning American 
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foreign policy that there was no isolationism but instead an unbroken chain of 
unilateralist internationalism loomed in the background, which to a large extent 
sprang from American exceptionalism as one of the basic building blocks of 
American identity. "e basic pillar of the Versailles Peace Treaty was the League 
of Nations, which was based on the idea of international cooperation. But while 
Wilson thought this could be done with American leadership, Henry Cabot Lodge 
refused to accept that assumption. He rather wanted to see freedom of choice in 
American foreign policy and that is the reason why he opposed the League, but not 
as an organization that was under American control and, consequently, would have 
given the United States a free hand. It was not the country that was isolationist 
but the political elite that had been brought up on American exceptionalism: and 
these people could not agree as to what path to pursue on the international stage. 
As Restad states, “the unilateral internationalism of Henry Cabot Lodge fought 
against the multilateral internationalism of Woodrow Wilson.” (133) Also, the 
whole decade of the 1920s was far from as isolationist as can be read in most 
books. "e United States played an active role in the reconstruction of Europe, 
whether $nancial, economic, or political aspects are viewed— and thanks to the 
omnipotent American capital, Europeans many times heeded American wishes and 
expectations. "e 1930s meant only a relative decline in this trend and not further 
isolationism, although it is beyond dispute that due to the Great Depression the 
domestic scene far outweighed the international drama. And of course, to speak 
of isolationism in the interwar years concerning Latin America or Asia would be 
denying the facts. Isolationism as such was a Eurocentric interpretation only.
"e argument is similar about World War II but one level higher: Pearl Harbor 
was not the cause but the catalyst of U.S. entry into the war; the new world 
order created by the United States dovetailed with American exceptionalism and 
unilateralism; and, therefore, the continuity of American foreign policy dominates 
as opposed to the opinions that hold that internationalism appeared only at this 
time in U.S. foreign conduct. American public opinion already before Pearl 
Harbor leaned toward entering the war according to contemporary measuring, and 
Franklin Roosevelt, with the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, had started to put 
the postwar order in place, also prior to the Japanese attack. "e United States thus 
created a multilateral world for itself in sharp contrast to joining one, an immense 
di#erence. In this reading, and this is the pivotal point of Restad’s argument, the 
world order after World War II was not a resuscitation of the Wilsonian idea, 
but rather achieving the Lodgean internationalism. Most issues in the Charter 
of the United Nations were to protect American independence from possible 
international restraint. Most of what Lodge had objected to a generation earlier 
now found its way to the new charter thereby ensuring American independence on 
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the international scene. It is worth mentioning that the Soviet Union accepted the 
crucial veto power of the $ve permanent members of the Security Council—they 
wanted, and secured, a free hand as well. 
"e next stop is the post-Cold War world, which in Restad’s argument did not 
bring any perceptible change regarding U.S. foreign policy. "e author demonstrates 
that the foreign policy of the George H. W. Bush-Bill Clinton-George W. Bush trio 
all served the same goal: to protect American leadership in the world. Although 
on the level of rhetoric there were di#erences, the unilateral internationalism can 
well be shown. And according to Restad, American exceptionalism played a big 
part in this. A good example of preserving American interests over the interest of 
the international community is that at the time of the $rst Iraq War Congress gave 
approval for military action by a much closer margin than in 2002. Naturally, the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was not nearly as serious a national security threat as 
the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 resulting in the death of almost 
three thousand Americans. One of the sad side e#ects of the “War on Terror” is its 
negative practice on human rights. Restad proves, however, that even in this $eld 
there has been continuity that dates back to the start of the Cold War. "e upshot 
is, again, that there is no radical change but permanence in U.S. foreign policy. If 
there was novelty, that was the younger Bush’s rhetoric: “American exceptionalism 
and unilateral internationalism was laid bare by the Bush administration’s lack of 
diplomatic gloss.” (216)
In the closing chapter the author paints the picture of American exceptionalism 
today, and she argues that with the appearance of Barack Obama and his 
interpretation the death toll of American exceptionalism has been sounded. "e 
long and unsuccessful military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, together 
with the economic recession in 2008, altogether produce symptoms similar to 
the mid-1970s. Its e#ect on domestic policy was that Obama, partly in order to 
boost his reelection chances, became the most fervent proponent of American 
exceptionalism in recent memory. Restad’s book is important because it gives a new 
interpretation regarding U.S. foreign policy based on clear reasoning. "e feeling of 
exceptionalism is a major historical component of the collective American psyche 
that has left its mark on all of the $elds of American life throughout the centuries. 
"erefore, it is not shocking that this was the case in foreign policy as well—but 
thanks to Restad, now we understand that this aspect has been more crucial than 
earlier thought. It is safe to say that the United States will in the future follow the 
same path in the world: it will always pursue a free-hand approach, even if there 
may be a thin veneer of multilateral tinge to it. "ere can only be change in this 
manner if the United States loses its immense in%uence on the world, but that 
seems to be in the distant future.
